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JOHNSON V. CALIFORNIA: A GRAYER 
SHADE OF BROWN 
BRANDON N. ROBINSON 
INTRODUCTION 
For decades, the famous school desegregation case of Brown v. 
Board of Education1 and its progeny have supported the notion “that 
a State may not constitutionally require [racial] segregation of public 
facilities.”2 Indeed, with regard to state-mandated racial segregation, 
the doctrine of “separate but equal” has long been considered dead 
and buried.3 In February 2005, however, the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Johnson v. California4 curiously reopened the 
segregation question by replacing the post-Brown ban on racial 
segregation with the strict scrutiny standard of review afforded to all 
other racial classifications,5 thereby muddying the once clear doctrinal 
waters. 
Johnson dealt with an unwritten policy of the California 
Department of Corrections (CDC), by which new correctional facility 
prisoners were segregated in double cells according to race for up to 
sixty days.6 During those sixty days, prison officials “evaluate[d] the 
inmates to determine their ultimate placement.”7 Although the 
 
Copyright © 2006 by Brandon N. Robinson. 
 1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 2. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (per curiam) (citing Brown, 347 U.S. at 495) 
In this case, the Court reversed the conviction of a black citizen for refusing to sit in the seats 
reserved for minorities in traffic court. Id. 
 3. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506 (2005) (The U.S. Supreme Court “rejected the 
notion that that separate can ever be equal—or neutral—50 years ago”); see Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896) (upholding a Louisiana state law requiring separate but equal 
railway cars for blacks and whites), overruled by Brown v. Bd of Educ., 347 U.S. at 494–95 
(1954) (“Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding [that separate is not equal] 
is rejected.”). 
 4. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 499. 
 5. Id. at 515. 
 6. Id. at 502. 
 7. Id. 
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double-cell assignments were based on a number of factors including 
race, the CDC conceded “that the chances of an inmate being 
assigned a cellmate of another race [were] ‘[p]retty close’ to zero 
percent.”8 
The CDC asserted that such a policy was “necessary to prevent 
violence caused by racial gangs.”9 According to one witness, if race 
were not considered in making initial housing assignments, there 
would undoubtedly be “racial conflict in the cells and in the yard.”10 
All other prison facilities other than the double cells in the reception 
area were fully integrated—including dining areas, yards, and cells.11 
After the sixty-day holding period, “prisoners [were] allowed to 
choose their own cellmates” and inmate requests to be housed 
together were usually granted, barring any “security reasons” for 
denial.12 
Garrison S. Johnson was an African-American inmate in the 
California prison system who had been housed at several California 
prison facilities13 since his incarceration and arrival at Folsom prison 
in 1987.14 “[E]ach time he was transferred to a new facility . . . , 
Johnson was double-celled with another African-American inmate.”15 
Importantly, in deciding this case, the Johnson Court established 
strict scrutiny as the proper standard of review for a policy of 
temporary racial segregation in prisons, stating that “all racial 
classifications” are subject to strict scrutiny.16 This decision contrasts, 
however, with a long line of precedents beginning with Brown v. 
 
 8. Id. (quoting Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3a, Johnson, 543 U.S. 499 
(No. 03-636)). “[A] corrections official . . . testified that an exception to this policy was once 
granted to a Hispanic inmate who had been ‘raised with Crips’. . . .” Id. at 517 n.1 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra, at 184a). 
Notwithstanding this lone exception, Justice Stevens, dissenting, noted that “the CDC’s 
suggestion that its policy is therefore flexible . . . strains credulity.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 9. Id. at 502 (majority opinion). The Brief for the Respondents cited several incidents of 
racially-motivated violence in CDC facilities, identifying “five major prison gangs in the State: 
Mexican Mafia, Nuestra Familia, Black Guerrilla Family, Aryan Brotherhood, and Nazi Low 
Riders.” Id. (citing Brief for Respondents at 2, Johnson, 543 U.S. 499 (No. 03-636)). 
 10. Id. at 503 (citing Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 215a). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Johnson had previously “been through the inmate reception centers at Chino, Folsom, 
and Calipatria, and [was] incarcerated at Lancaster” at the time of his appeal to the Ninth 
Circuit. Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 14. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 503. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 505 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)). 
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Board of Education,17 standing for the principle that racial segregation 
is inherently unequal and thus violative of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, therefore any racial segregation in public facilities is 
prohibited.18 Moreover, Johnson does not limit its decision to the 
prison context, but rather broadly asserts that racial segregation is 
now to be treated like any other racial classification.19 
This Note first attempts to present the apparent inconsistencies 
between the unique historical treatment of racial segregation in 
Brown and progeny and the strict scrutiny standard imposed by 
Johnson. It next examines Johnson more closely and presents four 
interrelated responses that can be used to reconcile these 
inconsistencies and account for the decision: (1) the court simply 
failed to consider the issue; (2) the holdings in Brown and progeny 
are more limited than a complete ban on racial segregation in all 
public facilities; (3) an evolution in the social context and meaning 
attached to racial segregation over fifty-one years has produced a 
shift in the application of anticlassification and antisubordination 
principles, allowing Johnson to change the standard of review; and (4) 
in balancing these principles, the imposition of strict scrutiny can be 
seen as a middle ground or compromise among three sets of 
precedents—per se prohibition in Brown, strict scrutiny in all other 
racial discrimination jurisprudence such as Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena20 and Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company,21 and the 
 
 17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 18. Id. at 483. There have been numerous post-Brown decisions extending the ban on 
segregation past the realm of public education. See, e.g., Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) 
(ordinance requiring segregation in municipal auditorium); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 
(1963) (courtroom seating); Turner v. Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (administrative regulation 
requiring segregation in airport restaurant); State Athletic Comm’n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 
(1959), aff’g per curiam 168 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. La. 1958) (athletic contests); Gayle v. Bowder, 
352 U.S. 903 (1956) (state-mandated segregation on buses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 
(1955), vacating per curiam 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955) (municipal golf courses); Mayor of Balt. 
v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955), aff’g per curiam 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (public beaches 
and bathhouses); Bohler v. Lane, 204 F. Supp. 168 (S.D. Fla. 1962) (separate drinking fountains, 
restrooms, and entrances at public recreational facilities); Shuttlesworth v. Gaylord, 202 F. 
Supp. 59 (N.D. Ala. 1961), aff’d, 310 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1962) (recreational facilities); Banks v. 
Hous. Auth., 260 P.2d 668 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954) 
(administrative regulation requiring segregation in public housing). 
 19. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 509. 
 20. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). The Court in Adarand applied 
strict scrutiny to preferences toward minority businesses in government contracting. Id. at 226. 
 21. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) The Court in Croson held that a 
minority set-aside program was violative of the Equal Protection Clause because appellant city 
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deferential “reasonable-relationship” test with respect to other 
fundamental rights in the prison context in Turner v. Safley.22 Rather 
than mutually exclusive or competing theories, these reconciliations 
should be seen as building blocks, each of which contributes to the 
others’ validity. 
I.  THE BROWN DECISION: ITS CONTEXT AND ITS PROGENY 
A. Preamble: The Civil War Amendments, Plessy, and Korematsu 
The aftermath of the Civil War and the accompanying abolition 
of slavery led to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution.23 The Fourteenth 
Amendment establishes a constitutional definition of national 
citizenship and forbids the states to abridge the “incidents” of such 
citizenship.24 It also forbids the states to deny equal protection to any 
person or to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property “without 
due process of law,”25 and it grants Congress the power to enforce 
such protection through “appropriate legislation.”26 
The extent to which these amendments restricted the 
government from regulating or allocating by race, however, remained 
 
failed to show a compelling interest in apportioning public contract opportunities on the basis of 
race. Id. at 511. 
 22. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). The Court in Turner held that “when a prison 
regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably 
related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 89. 
 23. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits all forms of involuntary servitude and allows 
Congress to enforce the prohibition through federal law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. The 
Fifteenth Amendment explicitly protects the right to vote from abridgement “on account of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude,” again allowing Congress to enforce such 
protection through “appropriate legislation.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV. Although the Thirteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments are discussed in some of the following cases, this note will focus on 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the subject of analysis in the Johnson and Brown cases. See 
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505–15 (2005); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489–96 
(1954). 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside.”). 
 25. Id. (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 26. Id. § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article.”). 
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unsettled at the time, and “remains unsettled even now.”27 Following 
the ratification of the three amendments, the Supreme Court 
marginalized their immediate impact.28 In a series of cases known as 
the Civil Rights Cases, federal statutes forbidding racial 
discrimination by commercial enterprises “were held to be excessive, 
as acts of an unwarranted color-blind zeal.”29 In the eyes of the Court, 
“[t]he fourteenth amendment provided no basis for such 
legislation . . . because that amendment reached only the 
government’s own denials of equal protection, not those of private, 
commercial parties.”30 
With respect to both government and private action, racial 
discrimination could not be forbidden per se; the question was not 
whether there was allocation on the basis of race, but rather “whether 
the particular regulation by race was constitutionally ‘reasonable.’”31 
The Court’s treatment of the Civil War Amendments reflected 
deference to legislative bodies to sort out benign from invidious uses 
of race, and supported the view that as long as “individuals [could] be 
equally protected, albeit racially regulated, then nothing in the 
command or ethos of the fourteenth amendment was deemed to deny 
the use of racial classification to the body of American politics.”32 This 
view continued to develop through the end of the nineteenth century 
and was cemented by the “separate but equal” decision of Plessy v. 
Ferguson.33 
In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana 
statute requiring separate railway cars for blacks and whites.34 
 
 27. William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 
46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 775 (1979); see also id. at 776–77 (“The materials of enlightened 
constitutional interpretation permit us . . . to treat the Constitution as repudiating the propriety 
of regulating people by race or allocating among people by race, but they do not compel that 
conclusion. It is oddly a matter of what we might wish to make of it.”). 
 28. Id. at 780–81 (“With the exception of a few notable cases striking down the most 
egregious race regulations, the Supreme Court adopted a wholly tolerant and deferential 
rendering of all three amendments, imputing to them only the most modest consequences.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 29. Id. at 780 & nn.14–15. 
 30. Id. at 780. 
 31. Id. at 780–81. 
 32. Id. at 781. 
 33. 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896). 
 34. Id. at 542 (“That it does not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished 
slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for a crime, is too clear for 
argument.”); id. at 550–51 (“[W]e cannot say that a law which authorizes is unreasonable, or 
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Although the Fourteenth Amendment was “undoubtedly [designed] 
to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law,” the 
Court held, “it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions 
based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political 
equality. . . .”35 Examples of such allegedly lawful distinctions included 
segregation of public schools36 and prohibition of intermarriage 
between the races.37 The Court further held, moreover, that any 
tendency of racial segregation to “stamp[] the colored race with a 
badge of inferiority . . . . [was] not by reason of anything found in the 
act, but solely because the colored race [chose] to put that 
construction upon it.”38 
Justice Harlan alone provided a vigorous dissent, rooted in a 
more expansive view of the Civil War Amendments and drawn from 
“the lessons of his own contemporary history.”39 The Civil War 
Amendments, in Justice Harlan’s view, were about anticlassification, 
as they “removed the race line from our governmental systems.”40 To 
the antisubordination-based argument that the Louisiana statute was 
applied equally to both whites and blacks, Justice Harlan retorted: 
“Every one knows that the statute in question had its origins in the 
purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars 
occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches 
occupied by . . . white persons.”41 “No one,” he added, “would be so 
wanting in candor as to assert the contrary.”42 
Taking what he deemed to be a “reasonable construction” of the 
amendments, Justice Harlan advocated the anticlassification view that 
the Constitution is “color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates 
classes among citizens.”43 Conceding that race pride may be expressed 
to the extent that “the rights of others . . . are not to be affected,” 
Harlan “den[ied] that any legislative body or judicial tribunal may 
have regard to the race of citizens when the civil rights of those 
 
more obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the acts . . . requiring separate schools for 
colored children . . . .”). 
 35. Id. at 544. 
 36. Id. at 544 (citing Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 206 (1849)). 
 37. Id. at 545 (citing State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 405 (1871)). 
 38. Id. at 551. 
 39. Van Alstyne, supra note 27, at 781. 
 40. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 41. Id. at 557. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 559. 
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citizens are involved,” for such legislation is “inconsistent not only 
with that equality of rights which pertain to citizenship, National and 
State, but with the personal liberty enjoyed by every one within the 
United States.”44 
For almost fifty-eight years, Justice Harlan’s unrequited dissent 
languished on the dusty bookshelves of judicial history,45 while the 
Court continued to hold the view expressed in Plessy, that the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not prevent legislative bodies from 
regulating by race. State legislative bodies, without much judicial 
resistance,46 continued to enact a series of race-based laws.47 The 
exclusion of others based on race would remain unchallenged and 
even unscrutinized until Korematsu v. United States.48 
Three years after the attack on Pearl Harbor, and in the twilight 
of World War II, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a 
Japanese American for violating a civilian exclusion order which 
excluded all persons of Japanese ancestry from a particular 
 
 44. Id. at 554–55. 
 45. Of the twenty-seven cases citing Plessy between 1986 and 1954, no federal case 
mentions Justice Harlan’s dissent. Only four state cases mention it. Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 
31–32 (Cal. 1948) (granting a petition for mandamus to request the clerk issue a marriage 
license to a racially mixed couple); Tyler v. Harmon, 104 So. 200, 202–03 (La. 1925) (rejecting 
the plaintiff’s plea that the Fourteenth Amendment made unconstitutional a New Orleans 
statute prohibiting members of different races from establishing residence in the same 
neighborhoods); Commonwealth v. George, 61 Pa. Super. 412, 420 (Super. Ct. 1915) (holding 
that the jury may appropriately determine whether accommodations for African Americans 
were reasonable); Smith v. State, 46 S.W. 566, 569 (Tenn. 1898) (holding that a Louisiana statute 
requiring segregation on a public conveyance did not violate the Interstate Commerce Clause); 
see also Chesapeake & O.R. Co. v. Kentucky, 179 U.S. 388, 395 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting 
without opinion) (dissenting from the majority’s affirmation of a railway company’s conviction 
for violation of a statute requiring separate cars for the races). 
 46. A few cases in the time leading up to Brown, however, began to erode the applicability 
of the separate but equal doctrine. See McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641 
(1950) (“[Graduate school segregation] impair[s] and inhibit[s] [students’] ability to study, to 
engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and in general to learn [their] 
profession[s].”); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 636 (1950) (ordering the University of Texas 
Law School to admit a black student on the ground that the nearby black law school was 
unequal); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 633 (1948) (per curiam) (holding that it was 
unconstitutional for the only law school in the state of Oklahoma to deny the petitioner on the 
basis of his race without providing him a legal education in conformity with that provided to 
white Oklahoma residents). 
 47. See, e.g., Berea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 58 (1908) (upholding the trial conviction 
of a college for violation of a state act by willfully admitting both white and black pupils); 
McCabe v. Atchison, 186 F. 966, 969 (8th Cir. 1911) (upholding an Oklahoma act requiring 
racial segregation of railway cars); Hayes v. Crutcher, 108 F. Supp. 582, 584–85 (M.D. Tenn. 
1952) (upholding the separate but equal doctrine with respect to public golf courses). 
 48. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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designated military area.49 The opinion began by noting that “all legal 
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are 
immediately suspect.”50 Although such legal restrictions are not 
unconstitutional per se, the majority continued, “courts must subject 
them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may 
sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism 
never can.”51 Although not explicitly specifying “strict scrutiny” as the 
standard of review, the court then proceeded to apply a closely 
analogous level of scrutiny, assessing the compelling need for the 
order52 and the narrowness of the military’s remedy.53 
The judicial approval, under Korematsu, of legal restrictions that 
“curtail the civil rights of a single racial group”54 was short lived, 
however, as courts began to question the underlying premise of the 
separate but equal doctrine.55 In the last of the Supreme Court 
segregation cases before Brown, the Supreme Court implicitly 
recognized the intangible disadvantages to racial segregation by 
holding that once black students were admitted to an all-white school, 
they could not be forced to sit in segregated areas of classrooms, 
libraries, and cafeterias, as such segregation hindered the students’ 
 
 49. Id. at 215–16; see Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 102 (1943) (affirming 
conviction of defendant for violating curfew imposed on persons of Japanese ancestry). 
 50. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
 51. Id. (emphasis added). 
 52. See id. at 219–20 (“Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes, 
except under the circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic 
governmental institutions. But when under conditions of modern warfare our shores are 
threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened 
danger.”); id. at 219 (“[H]ardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships.”). 
 53. See id. at 218 (“We cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did 
not have ground for believing that in a critical hour [disloyal Japanese Americans] could not 
readily be isolated and separately dealt with . . . .”). 
 54. Id. at 216. 
 55. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) (“[P]etitioner may claim his full 
constitutional right: legal education equivalent to that offered by the State to students of other 
races. Such education is not available to him in a separate law school as offered by the State.”); 
Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 633 (1948) (declaring unconstitutional Oklahoma’s 
refusal to provide legal education for blacks while maintaining a white law school); Missouri ex 
rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 349 (1938) (issuing a mandamus in favor of the petitioner, 
an African-American law student who was denied entry into Missouri State University Law 
School because of his race); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (declaring 
unconstitutional a Kentucky law mandating racial segregation in housing). But see Fisher v. 
Hurst, 333 U.S. 147, 150–51 (1948) (denying the plaintiff leave to file for a writ of mandamus 
when the state responded to Sipuel by establishing a law school for blacks). 
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“ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with 
other students, and, in general, to learn [their] profession.”56 
B. The Brown Decision 
In the 1952 Term, the Supreme Court granted review in five 
cases that challenged the Plessy doctrine of “separate but equal” with 
respect to public secondary education.57 The Brown Court 
unanimously held that “in the field of education the doctrine of 
‘separate but equal’ has no place.”58 The Court’s main difficulty in 
reaching this conclusion was rooted in the clear precedent of Plessy 
that segregation (and, more broadly, distinctions based on color) did 
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and that any alleged stigma 
or “badge of inferiority” due to segregation existed in the 
psychological “construction” that “colored people” placed on it.59 
The Court, however, minimized the propriety of either historical 
or doctrinal interpretation, choosing instead to examine the realm of 
public education in light of present day national ethos, noting that 
“we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was 
adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We 
must consider public education in the light of its full development and 
its present place in American life throughout the Nation.”60 Citing 
Sweatt v. Painter61 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents62 for the 
proposition that some benefits of education may be intangible, the 
Brown Court held that segregation of public schools, though physical 
facilities and other “tangible benefits” may be equal, “deprive[s] the 
children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities” in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.63 For support, the Court 
 
 56. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950). 
 57. For a discussion of the consolidation of the five cases, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE 
JUSTICE 540–42 (1975). 
 58. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 59. 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
 60. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492–93; see also ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 43 
(1995) (“The decision did not turn on what the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought, 
or on what the Court had previously held in Plessy v. Ferguson. Instead, the ideal of racial 
equality had become so pressing to the Court that there was no alternative but to interpret the 
Equal Protection Clause in light of its imperatives. But because this interpretation rested upon 
an open avowal of a national ideal, Brown represented a courageous gamble.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 61. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950). 
 62. McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950). 
 63. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493, 495. 
09__ROBINSON.DOC 11/14/2006  8:42 AM 
352 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:343 
relied on “modern authority” in the form of extensive social science 
evidence.64 Ignoring the strict scrutiny standard applied to racial 
classifications in Hirabayashi v. United States65 and Korematsu,66 the 
Brown Court held racial segregation in public schools to be a per se 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
C. Progeny: The Subsequent Expansion of Brown 
As the Supreme Court wrestled with the implementation of 
school desegregation in various states,67 it also handed down a series 
of per curiam summary decisions that extended Brown past the realm 
of public education and into other areas of public life.68 “In each 
instance, the fulcrum of judicial leverage was an existing governmental 
race line, which the particular judicial order sought to remove.”69 
Despite the controversial nature of the Brown decision, the per 
curiam decisions provided no written opinions for their judgments, 
but simply cited Brown as support, thus implicating the same 
rationale. This piecemeal expansion of Brown to other areas of public 
facilities eventually led the Supreme Court to declare that “it is no 
longer open to question that a State may not constitutionally require 
segregation of public facilities.”70 
 
 64. Id. at 494 n.11. 
 65. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 66. See supra text accompanying notes 49–53. 
 67. See generally Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) 
(addressing the issue of the federal court’s power to issue desegregation remedies); Rogers v. 
Paul, 382 U.S. 198 (1965) (allowing transfers of the petitioners to schools with more extensive 
curricula while the public schools desegregated at the rate of one grade a year); Griffin v. 
County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (holding that the defendant may not close public schools 
and open white private schools in lieu of desegregation); Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 
(1963) (prohibiting voluntary transfer provisions on the ground that they promoted 
discrimination); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (ordering desegregation of the Little Rock, 
Arkansas school system). But see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (limiting the power of 
federal courts in imposing remedies). 
 68. For a list of examples of these summary decisions, see supra note 18. 
 69. Van Alstyne, supra note 27, at 784. Despite this characterization of Brown’s progeny, 
several scholars nevertheless opine that race-consciousness in affirmative action should be 
viewed differently. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 274 n.8 (1995) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“‘To pretend . . . that the issue presented in Bakke was the same as 
the issue in Brown is to pretend that history never happened and that the present doesn’t 
exist.’” (quoting Stephen Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 433–34 
(1988))). 
 70. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (reversing the appellant’s conviction for 
refusing to sit in the seats reserved for minorities in traffic court). 
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D. Lee v. Washington: Racial Segregation in the Prison Context 
The issue of racial segregation in the prison context was not 
squarely addressed until 1968, when the Supreme Court affirmed, in a 
per curiam opinion, a three-judge panel decision from the Middle 
District of Alabama, which held that an Alabama statute requiring 
racial segregation in prisons and jails violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment.71 In the district court, the defendants had argued that 
the practice was “a matter of routine prison security and discipline 
and . . . therefore not within the scope of permissible inquiry by the 
courts.”72 The district court rejected this argument, responding that 
“[s]ince Brown v. Board of Education . . . and the numerous cases 
implementing that decision, it is unmistakably clear that racial 
discrimination by governmental authorities in the use of public 
facilities cannot be tolerated.”73 The district court recognized that 
there is merit in the contention that in some isolated instances 
prison security and discipline necessitates segregation of the races 
for a limited period . . . [h]owever . . . recognition of such instances 
does nothing to bolster the statutes or the general practice that 
requires or permits prison or jail officials to separate the races 
arbitrarily. Such statutes and practices must be declared 
unconstitutional in light of the clear principles controlling.74 
The district court then warned that “there should be no 
misunderstanding on the part of any of the officials involved 
concerning the duty imposed upon them . . . to cease the practice of 
arbitrarily segregating the races in . . . penal facilities.”75 
On appeal, the Supreme Court issued a one paragraph per 
curiam affirmance of the district court’s three-judge panel decision. 
The paragraph made no mention of Brown or any corresponding 
standard of review, but instead neglected the issue by merely noting 
that it found “unexceptionable”76 a district court opinion that failed to 
 
 71. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333–34 (1968) (per curiam). 
 72. Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1966). 
 73. Id. at 331 (citing Johnson, 373 U.S. at 62). 
 74. Id. at 331–32. As an example of such an isolated instance, the district court mentioned 
“the ‘tank’ used in the City of Birmingham . . . where intoxicated persons are placed upon their 
initial incarceration and kept until they become sober. According to the evidence in this case, 
the population of the ‘tank’ on Saturday nights in the Birmingham jail reaches fifty or more.” Id. 
at 332 n.6. 
 75. Id. at 333. 
 76. Lee, 390 U.S. at 333–34. 
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explicitly mention any standard of review.77 A three-Justice 
concurrence clarified that “prison authorities have the right, acting in 
good faith and in particularized circumstances, to take into account 
racial tensions in maintaining security, discipline, and good order in 
prisons and jails,” but insisted that their “explicit pronouncement [did 
not evince] any dilution of this Court’s firm commitment to the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition of racial discrimination.”78 
Ultimately, aside from a weak and ambiguous three-Justice 
concurrence, the Court summarily affirmed a district court opinion79 
that had cited both Brown and Johnson v. Virginia, even in the prison 
context.80 
II.  JOHNSON V. CALIFORNIA 
Thirty-seven years later, the Court again took up the issue of 
racial segregation in prisons with the case of Johnson v. California.81 
Johnson, an African-American prisoner in the California correctional 
system, filed a pro se complaint alleging that the CDC’s policy 
violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment by assigning him cellmates on the basis of his race.82 The 
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s initial 
dismissal, holding that “Johnson had stated a claim for racial 
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”83 On 
remand, the district court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants on the ground that the CDC officials’ conduct, not clearly 
unconstitutional, was entitled to qualified immunity.84 The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed, holding that the deferential Turner v. Safley85 
standard applied as opposed to strict scrutiny.86 Because Johnson did 
not satisfy the burden of refuting the “common-sense connection” 
 
 77. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 539 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The 
majority claims that Lee applied a heightened standard of review. But Lee did not address the 
applicable standard of review.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally Washington 
v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966). 
 78. Lee, 390 U.S. at 334 (Black, J., concurring). 
 79. Id. at 333–34. 
 80. Lee, 263 F. Supp. at 331. 
 81. 543 U.S. 499 (2005). For an overview of the facts, see supra Introduction. 
 82. Id. at 503. 
 83. Id. at 503–04. 
 84. Id. at 504. 
 85. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 86. Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 798–99 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 543 U.S. 499 (2005). 
09__ROBINSON.DOC 11/14/2006  8:42 AM 
2006] JOHNSON V. CALIFORNIA 355 
between the policy and prison violence,87 the policy survived the less 
rigorous Turner standard.88 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals then denied Johnson’s 
petition for rehearing en banc.89 A four-judge dissent disagreed, 
stating that “[t]he panel’s decision ignore[d] the Supreme Court’s 
repeated and unequivocal command that all racial classifications 
imposed by the government must be analyzed by a reviewing court 
under strict scrutiny.”90 After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court 
declared strict scrutiny to be the proper standard of review and 
remanded the matter to the lower court to determine whether the 
policy survives the standard.91 
A. The Majority 
The majority divided its analysis into two parts, the first 
considering general reasons for imposing strict scrutiny in this 
context, and the second explaining why the deferential standard 
commonly applied to inmates’ fundamental rights did not apply in 
this context. The majority first began the more general part of its 
analysis by asserting that “‘all racial classifications [imposed by 
government] . . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict 
scrutiny,’”92 and that even benign racial classifications are reviewed 
under strict scrutiny.93 
Second, the Court noted that it had “previously applied a 
heightened standard of review in evaluating racial segregation in 
prisons” in Lee v. Washington.94 As evidence of the heightened 
scrutiny in Lee, the Court pointed to the three-Justice concurrence 
that “‘prison authorities have the right, acting in good faith and in 
particularized circumstances, to take into account racial tensions in 
 
 87. Id. at 801–02. 
 88. Id. at 807. 
 89. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505. 
 90. Johnson v. California, 336 F.3d 1117, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 91. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 515. 
 92. Id. at 505 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)) 
(emphasis in Johnson). 
 93. Id. (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226; 
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650 (1993)). Note that some Justices, notably Ginsburg, Souter, and 
Breyer, disagree on this point with respect to affirmative action. See supra note 69; infra notes 
118–19 and accompanying text. 
 94. Id. at 506 (citing Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333–34 (1968) (per curiam)). 
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maintaining security, discipline, and good order in prisons and 
jails.’”95 
Third, the Court rejected the idea that the government’s interest 
in preventing racial violence obviated the need for strict scrutiny 
because “racial classifications ‘threaten to stigmatize individuals by 
reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial 
hostility.’”96 By “perpetuating the notion that race matters” through 
the insistence that inmates be housed with inmates of the same race, 
the Court explained that prison authorities could possibly breed 
further racial hostility and thus “exacerbate the very patterns of 
[violence that the policy is] said to counteract.”97 
Fourth, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that “[v]irtually 
all other states and the Federal Government manage their prison 
systems without reliance on racial segregation.”98 Moreover, the 
Court noted the United States’ contention that “racial integration 
actually ‘leads to less violence in BOP’s [Bureau of Prisons] 
institutions and better prepares inmates for re-entry into society.’”99 
Because the CDC’s policy as a racial classification is “immediately 
suspect,” the Court concluded, the lower court erred in failing to 
apply strict scrutiny.100 
In the second part of the Court’s analysis, focusing on the 
comparison of the strict scrutiny given to racial classifications with the 
deferential Turner v. Safley101 standard commonly applied to inmates’ 
fundamental rights, the Court first distinguished Turner by insisting 
 
 95. Id. at 507 (citing Lee, 390 U.S. at 333–34); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I conclude that only those measures the State must 
take to provide a bulwark against anarchy, or to prevent [imminent] violence, will constitute a 
‘pressing public necessity.’”); cf. Lee, 390 U.S. at 334 (Black, J., concurring) (indicating that 
protecting prisoners from violence might justify narrowly tailored racial discrimination); City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“At least where 
state or local action is at issue, only a social emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to 
life and limb . . . can justify [racial discrimination].”). 
 96. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 507 (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643) (emphasis in Johnson). 
 97. Id. (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648). 
 98. Id. at 508–09 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 551.90 (2004)) (“[BOP] staff shall not discriminate 
against inmates on the basis of race, religion, national origin, sex, disability, or political belief. 
This includes the making of administrative decisions and providing access to work, housing and 
programs.”). 
 99. Id. at 509 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 
25, Johnson, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (No. 03-636)). 
 100. Id. 
 101. 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (applying the “legitimate penological interest” standard to prison 
policies regulating personal correspondence and inmate marriage). 
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that it had “never applied Turner to racial classifications.”102 Turner 
did not limit Lee, but instead had been applied “only to rights that are 
‘inconsistent with proper incarceration.’”103 The right not to be 
racially discriminated against, however, was not a right that need be 
compromised for the sake of proper prison administration, and thus 
was not “susceptible to the logic of Turner.”104 Similarly, claims of 
cruel and unusual punishment were not analyzed under Turner, but 
rather the “deliberate indifference” standard.105 
Second, the Johnson Court held strict scrutiny to be the proper 
standard because to grant an exception to the application of strict 
scrutiny to all racial classifications would “undermine [the Court’s] 
‘unceasing efforts to eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal 
justice system.’”106 This principle, the Court noted, has driven the 
application of strict scrutiny to otherwise broadly deferential areas 
such as the use of race in peremptory jury strikes107 and redistricting.108 
Third, the Court interpreted the three-Justice concurrence in Lee 
to establish an exception to the color-blind principle articulated in 
Justice Harlan’s Plessy dissent.109 Determining whether that exception 
applies, concluded the Johnson Court, requires the application of 
strict scrutiny.110 
Fourth, the Johnson Court addressed Justice Thomas’s dissent, 
which argued that the judgment of whether race-based policies are 
necessary “‘[is] better left in the first instance to the officials who run 
our Nation’s prisons.’”111 The Turner standard drawn to its logical 
conclusion, the majority replied, would prove to be too lenient, 
 
 102. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 510. 
 103. Id. (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003)). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 511. 
 106. Id. at 512 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 (1987) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only 
because those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but 
also because every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race 
relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”). 
 107. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 512 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89–96 (1986)). 
 108. Id. (comparing the partisan gerrymandering in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) 
with the racial gerrymandering in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)). 
 109. Id. at 512–13 (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989)). 
 110. See id. at 515 (“We do not decide whether the CDC’s policy violates the Equal 
Protection Clause. We hold only that strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review . . . .”). 
 111. Id. at 513 (quoting id. at 542 (Thomas, J., dissenting)); see also infra, Part II.B.1. 
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allowing prison officials to use race-based policies even when they do 
not advance the interest at stake, and when other race-neutral 
policies are available.112 Such a standard would obviate any limitation 
on racial segregation in prisons at all.113 
Fifth and finally, the majority rejected the CDC’s argument that 
the application of strict scrutiny would be “‘strict in theory but fatal in 
fact’” and thus prohibit the use of racial segregation under any 
circumstance.114 Disagreeing with Justice Thomas’ description of the 
policy as “limited,” the majority contested that the policy in fact 
“applie[d] to all prisoners housed in double cells in reception centers, 
whether newly admitted or transferred from one facility to 
another.”115 Further, any nonracial factors taken into account were 
negligible, given that the CDC admitted that the chances of an inmate 
being housed with another of a different race were “‘[p]retty close’ to 
zero.”116 In contrast, prison administrators still “address[ed] the 
compelling interest in prison safety,” as long as they “demonstrate[d] 
that any race-based policies are narrowly tailored to that end.”117 
A concurrence authored by Justice Ginsburg and joined by 
Justices Souter and Breyer agreed with the Court’s result and 
opinion, subject to their pro-affirmative action reservation expressed 
in the Gratz v. Bollinger118 dissent that “[a]ctions designed to burden 
groups long denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked 
with measures taken to hasten the day when entrenched 
discrimination and its aftereffects have been extirpated.”119 
Disagreeing with the majority’s assertion that strict scrutiny is 
necessary for all racial classifications, the concurring Justices agreed 
that, as the CDC’s policy was neither necessary nor intended to 
“correct inequalities,” strict scrutiny was the proper standard.120 
 
 112. 543 U.S. at 513, 514 n.3. 
 113. Id. at 514. 
 114. Id. (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)). 
 115. Id. at 515 n.3. 
 116. See id. at 514–15 n.3 (“Justice Thomas characterizes the CDC’s policy as a ‘limited’ one, 
but the CDC’s policy is in fact sweeping in its application.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 117. Id. at 514. 
 118. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).  
 119. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 516 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Gratz, 539 U.S. at 301 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). 
 120. Id. at 516 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Herbert Wechsler, The Nationalization of 
Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, Supp. to 12 TEX. Q. 10, 23 (1968)). 
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B. The Dissents 
1. The Thomas Dissent.  Emphasizing the Turner standard of 
review in opposition to the majority’s Adarand/Gratz emphasis, a 
dissenting Justice Thomas noted that “[t]he Constitution has always 
demanded less within the prison walls” even with respect to rights 
“no less ‘fundamental’ than the right to be free from state-sponsored 
racial discrimination . . . .”121 
Describing the policy as “limited,”122 Justice Thomas noted that 
“[f]or most of this Nation’s history . . . defendants forfeited their 
constitutional rights [upon conviction and incarceration] and 
possessed instead only those rights that the State chose to extend 
them.”123 If the Turner standard is the Court’s “accommodation of the 
Constitution’s demands to those of prison administration,” Justice 
Thomas argued, then it should be applied with “uniformity,” 
regardless of the constitutional claim.124 
Justice Thomas next pointed out the safety concern that 
“subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an 
inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability 
to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to 
the intractable problems of prison administration.”125 Such a standard 
would unnecessarily force courts to be “the primary arbiters of what 
constitutes the best solution to every [prison] administrative 
problem . . . .”126 Given the very real dangers of racial gang violence in 
prisons,127 the CDC’s policy would survive the four factors of the 
Turner test: it is “reasonably related to a legitimate penological 
interest; alternative means of exercising the restricted right remain 
 
 121. Id. at 524 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia joined Thomas’s dissent. Id. 
 122. Id. at 525. 
 123. Id. at 528 (citation omitted). Justice Thomas then qualified this assertion by noting that 
the Court has recently “decided that incarceration does not divest prisoners of all constitutional 
protections” such as due process and free exercise of religion, see id. at 528–29, and so the initial 
question for a constitutional claim is whether the prisoner even possesses the disputed right at 
all, or whether it is a right that has been “divested” of him as a “condition of his conviction and 
confinement,” id. at 529 n.3. 
 124. See id. at 531 (“[W]e should apply [Turner] uniformly to prisoners’ challenges to their 
conditions of confinement.”). 
 125. Id. (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). 
 126. Id. at 531–32 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). 
 127. See id. at 532 (“[T]here is no more intractable problem inside America’s prisons than 
racial violence, which is driven by race-based prison gangs.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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open to inmates; racially integrating double cells might negatively 
impact prison inmates, staff, and administrators; and there are no 
obvious, easy alternatives to the CDC’s policy.”128 
After describing the broad applicability of the Turner test, 
Justice Thomas then characterized the majority’s decision to use strict 
scrutiny as based on both precedents and “its general skepticism of 
racial classifications.”129 The majority, he insisted, was “wrong on both 
scores.”130 
First, Justice Thomas rejected the majority’s degree of reliance 
on Lee as precedent.131 The Lee affirmance said nothing about the 
applicable standard of review, as there was no need—the “wholesale 
segregation of [Alabama’s] prisons”132 would have been 
unconstitutional under either strict scrutiny or a more deferential 
standard of review.133 
Second, Justice Thomas rejected the majority’s main rationale 
that the Turner standard applies only to rights that are “‘inconsistent 
with proper incarceration.’”134 He contended that such circular logic 
requires the court to have “some implicit notion of [how] a proper 
prison ought . . . to be administered” in order to know “whether any 
particular right is inconsistent with proper prison administration,” 
which “eviscerates” Turner’s prohibition on such second-guessing in 
the first place.135 In the many cases in which the Court has used 
Turner regarding speech or associational rights, expanded access to 
courts, freedom from bodily restraint, or free exercise rights, the 
Court has “steadfastly refused to undertake the threshold standard-
 
 128. Id. at 534. 
 129. Id. at 538. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. at 539 (“The majority claims that Lee applied ‘a heightened standard of review.’ 
But Lee did not address the applicable standard of review.”(citation omitted)). 
 132. Id. at 540. 
 133. See id. Even if Lee had announced a heightened standard of review for race-based 
prison policies, Thomas contended that the CDC policy would have satisfied such an exception: 
Johnson did not contest the “good faith” nature behind the CDC’s policy, and the policy, in its 
limited scope, applied only to new inmates and transfers held in double cells in a handful of 
prisons for no more than two months. Moreover, Thomas maintained that Adarand’s 
application of strict scrutiny for all racial classification was inapposite, as that case, which dealt 
with classifications favoring blacks, did not overrule Turner and progeny with respect to the 
unique context of prisons. Id. at 540–41. 
 134. Id. at 541 (quoting id. at 510 (majority opinion) (citations omitted)). 
 135. Id. at 541–42 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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of-review inquiry that Turner settled, and that the majority today 
resurrects.”136 
As for the majority’s contention that the Court has maintained a 
strict burden on state actors to justify race-based policies, even in 
“‘areas where those officials traditionally exercise substantial 
discretion,’”137 Justice Thomas pointed to the Grutter138 case, in which 
the Court deferred to the law school’s “‘educational judgment that . . . 
diversity is essential to its educational mission. . . .’”139 Deference, 
Justice Thomas pointed out, would seem all the more appropriate in 
the penal context than the educational one, for “whatever the Court 
knows of administering educational institutions, it knows much less 
about administering penal ones.”140 
Finally, Justice Thomas rejected the “parade of horribles” 
presented by the majority that would result from applying the 
allegedly “toothless” Turner standard.141 The CDC’s policy applied 
only to double cells, as opposed to dining halls, yards, etc., because 
they were particularly difficult to monitor.142 If the CDC’s policy were 
broader, there might be a more racially neutral means “at its disposal 
capable of accommodating prisoners’ rights without sacrificing their 
safety,” thus affecting one of the Turner factors.143 
2. The Stevens Dissent.  Justice Stevens’s dissent expressed the 
opinion that the CDC’s policy should be held unconstitutional under 
either level of scrutiny, rather than remanding to the lower court for 
application of the strict scrutiny standard.144 The policy, Justice 
Stevens wrote, “is based on a conclusive presumption that housing 
 
 136. Id. at 542. 
 137. Id. at 543 (quoting id. at 512 (majority opinion)). 
 138. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341–44 (2003) (upholding law school admissions 
policy using race as a “plus” factor as a narrowly tailored and thus constitutional remedy to the 
compelling interest of increasing diversity). 
 139. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 543 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328). 
 140. Id. at 543. 
 141. Id. at 547. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 517–23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In the final part of his dissent, Justice Thomas 
disagrees with Stevens’s characterization of the evidence presented. Id. at 548 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). According to Justice Thomas, as Johnson’s arguments and the lower court rulings 
concerned the application of Turner and the assumed precedence of Lee, the CDC had no 
obligation to present evidence of narrow tailoring and should therefore have such opportunity 
upon remand. Id. at 549–50. 
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inmates of different races together creates an unacceptable risk of 
racial violence” and assumes, without any individualized assessment, 
that “an inmate’s race is a proxy for gang membership, and gang 
membership is a proxy for violence.”145 Other prisons, both state and 
federal, have been able to maintain safety and security without 
“resorting to the expedient of segregation.”146 Justice Stevens thus 
agreed with the majority’s remand to the lower court to resolve the 
issue of qualified immunity, but dissented from the Court’s “refusal to 
decide, on the basis of the record before us, that the CDC’s policy is 
unconstitutional.”147 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Section A of this analysis points out the inconsistencies between 
the Johnson Court decision and judicial precedent regarding racial 
segregation as articulated by Brown and its progeny. The Court 
examined whether racial segregation in prison should be reviewed 
under strict scrutiny or the deferential “reasonable-relationship” test, 
without even considering the outright ban on racial segregation 
created in the realm of public education by Brown and subsequently 
expanded in piecemeal fashion to apply to all public facilities.148 
Because the Johnson majority equated segregation with all racial 
classifications, it ignored the unique treatment of racial segregation 
by courts since 1954. Section B of this analysis provides four 
interrelated frameworks that attempt to reconcile the inconsistencies. 
These reconciliations are not mutually exclusive alternative 
interpretations, but rather a series of interrelated possibilities, some 
of which support each other or expand on each other, and are 
intended to provoke discussion. They should thus be read as a group 
of possibilities, rather than a series of competing interpretations. 
A. The Inconsistencies 
First, the Johnson majority began by asserting that “‘all racial 
classifications [imposed by government] . . . must be analyzed by a 
 
 145. Id. at 517 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 146. Id. at 520. 
 147. Id. at 523. 
 148. See, e.g., Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (reversing the conviction of 
appellant for refusing to sit in the seats reserved for minorities in traffic court, stating that “it is 
no longer open to question that a State may not constitutionally require segregation of public 
facilities”). 
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reviewing court under strict scrutiny.’”149 Indeed, prior to Johnson, 
case law did hold that all racial classifications must be analyzed under 
strict scrutiny, and this remains accepted precedent.150 This argument 
does not clarify, however, why racial segregation, which has followed 
its own unique track separate from other racial classifications since 
Brown, should suddenly be accorded the same treatment as all other 
racial classifications. The application of strict scrutiny to all racial 
classifications has merit when deciding, as the Johnson opinion did, 
between strict scrutiny and a lesser standard of review. It does not 
explain, however, why the argument is not framed as a choice 
between strict scrutiny and a complete ban. 
Second, the majority relied on Lee v. Washington for the 
proposition that the Court has previously applied a heightened 
standard of review in evaluating racial segregation in prisons.151 As the 
Thomas dissent pointed out, however, the Lee decision was a one-
paragraph affirmance that made no mention of the applicable 
standard of review.152 Similarly, the district court opinion lacked any 
adoption of a particular standard of review—in fact, it cites Brown for 
the proposition that “[s]ince Brown v. Board of Education and the 
numerous cases implementing that decision, it is unmistakably clear 
that racial discrimination by governmental authorities in the use of 
public facilities cannot be tolerated.”153 
The idea that both Lee courts applied a heightened standard of 
review is not completely unwarranted. The district court did 
recognize that “in some isolated instances prison security and 
discipline necessitates segregation of the races for a limited period.”154 
 
 149. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505 (majority opinion) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)). 
 150. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (“[A]ll racial classifications . . . must be analyzed by a 
reviewing court under strict scrutiny . . . .”); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 
(1989) (holding strict scrutiny as proper standard of review for a 30 percent set-aside to 
minority-owned businesses in government contracting because “the standard of review under 
the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a 
particular classification”). 
 151. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 506–07 (citing Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333–34 (1968) 
(per curiam)). 
 152. Lee, 390 U.S. at 333–34; see supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text. 
 153. Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (citation omitted); see id. 
(“‘[It] is no longer open to question that a State may not constitutionally require segregation of 
public facilities.’” (quoting Johnson, 373 U.S. at 62)). 
 154. Id.; see also id. at 331 n.6 (using the “drunk tank” used in the City of Birmingham as an 
example of such an “isolated instance”). 
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Additionally, the three-Justice Supreme Court concurrence made 
explicit that “prison authorities have the right, acting in good faith 
and in particularized circumstances, to take into account racial 
tensions in maintaining security, discipline, and good order in prisons 
and jails.”155 Although these comments may imply a carved-out 
exception to the outright ban on racial segregation in public facilities, 
it is not clear that such comments, absent any mention of a standard 
of review, translate into the application of strict scrutiny. 
Third, the Johnson majority noted the principle that “racial 
classifications ‘threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their 
membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility.’”156 The 
proposition that racial classifications threaten to stigmatize is 
undoubtedly true; indeed, the Brown court recognized the stigma 
attached to racial segregation of public schools.157 Recognition of 
segregation’s stigmatic effect does little, however, to support the 
adoption of strict scrutiny over prohibition, and may even counsel 
against it. 
Fourth, the Johnson court observed that “virtually all other 
States and the Federal Government manage their prison systems 
without reliance on segregation.”158 Regardless of the merits of this 
contention, it puts the proverbial cart before the horse. As Justice 
Thomas’s dissent pointed out, the availability of race-neutral means 
to control racially motivated gang violence is relevant only to the 
application of the standard of review, a duty relegated to the lower 
court upon remand.159 Discussion of the narrowly tailored nature of 
the CDC’s policy seems circularly out of place in an opinion that 
purports to decide the standard of review and then remand for 
application of that standard. 
Fifth, the Johnson majority emphasized that the CDC’s policy, as 
an express racial classification, is “immediately suspect”160 and that 
 
 155. Lee, 390 U.S. at 334 (Black, J., concurring). 
 156. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 507 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993)) (emphasis in 
Johnson). 
 157. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“To separate [schoolchildren] of 
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to 
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be 
undone.”). 
 158. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 508. But see id. at 544–45 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that 
Oklahoma and Texas have adopted similar policies). 
 159. Id. at 544 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 542. 
 160. Id. at 509 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the deferential Turner test is thus inappropriate for review of racial 
classifications.161 Regardless of its merits, this assertion ignores that 
the threshold discussion under Brown should not be whether strict or 
lesser scrutiny applies, but rather whether racial segregation in 
prisons should even be tolerated at all. Indeed, according to Brown,162 
Johnson v. Virginia,163 and the district court in Lee,164 racial 
segregation should not be tolerated. 
Finally, the Johnson v. California majority concluded that 
granting the state an exemption from the rule that strict scrutiny 
applies to all racial classifications would “undermine [the Court’s] 
‘unceasing efforts to eradicate racial prejudice from [the] criminal 
justice system.’”165 This fails again to recognize that Brown and its 
progeny have created not an exemption for racial segregation, but a 
complete prohibition. Even taking into account the exception in the 
Lee Supreme Court concurrence, a “particularized circumstance” 
which “take[s] into account racial tensions” for a “limited time” does 
not necessarily equate to strict scrutiny, but indeed may suggest 
something even more rigorous.166 By applying strict scrutiny to racial 
segregation in prisons instead of declaring it unconstitutional, the 
Court may be doing exactly what it purports to avoid—undermining 
the judiciary’s “unceasing efforts” to eradicate racial prejudice from 
public facilities. 
B. The Reconciliations 
The previous analysis points out the arguable inconsistencies 
between the Johnson Court’s analytical framework and the history of 
jurisprudence of racial segregation since Brown. The following points, 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (“We conclude that in the field of public education the 
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal.”); see also Johnson, 543 U.S. at 506–07 (“Indeed, we rejected the notion that separate 
can ever be equal—or ‘neutral’—50 years ago in Brown v. Board of Education, and we refuse to 
resurrect it today.” (citation omitted)) 
 163. See Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (“[I]t is no longer open to question that 
a State may not constitutionally require segregation of public facilities.”). 
 164. See Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 331 (1966) (“[I]t is unmistakably clear that 
racial discrimination by governmental authorities in the use of public facilities cannot be 
tolerated.”). 
 165. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 512. 
 166. See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (“[P]rison authorities have the right, 
acting in good faith and in particularized circumstances, to take into account racial tensions in 
maintaining security, discipline, and good order in prisons and jails.”). 
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however, attempt to account for these inconsistencies. Although none 
of these reconciliations is alone sufficient, together they interrelate to 
build upon one another. For example, the limited doctrinal view of 
Brown may allow the Court to implicitly modify Brown’s reach 
according to modern principles; alternatively, the ambivalent 
evolution of Brown under the competing principles of 
anticlassification and antisubordination may have been the driving 
force behind the Court’s choice of a “middle-ground” compromise 
between three precedents. One should not perceive the following 
possibilities, therefore, as mutually exclusive or competing 
interpretations, but rather as building blocks, some of which are 
admittedly more intellectually solid than others. 
1. The Court Did Not Consider the Issue.  The first possibility is 
that the Court simply neglected to consider the possibility that Brown 
and its progeny strictly prohibited all racial segregation. Johnson did 
not assert in his complaint that the CDC’s policy was prohibited 
under Brown and its progeny, but rather assumed that both Lee and 
Turner applied, alleging only that the CDC’s policy was not “‘related 
to a legitimate penological interest.’”167 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit 
failed to discuss the applicable standard of review but resolved the 
tension between Turner and Lee in Turner’s favor.168 All of the amicus 
briefs submitted to the Court in support of the respondent, with the 
exception of that submitted by the ACLU,169 either failed to cite 
Brown entirely170 or characterized Brown and its progeny as 
advocating a strict scrutiny standard.171 It is thus possible that the 
Johnson Court simply addressed the issues presented before it 
without considering whether the prohibition on racial segregation 
 
 167. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 548 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v. California, 207 
F.3d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)). 
 168. Id.; see Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 798–99 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 169. Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union and its Three California 
Affiliates in Support of Petitioner at 13, Johnson, 543 U.S. 499 (No. 03-636) (“Racial 
classifications are antithetical to the Fourteenth Amendment, whose central purpose was to 
eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States.”) (internal citations 
and quotations omitted). 
 170. See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Johnson, 543 U.S. 499 (No. 03-636); Brief of Former State Corrections Officials as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Petitioner, Johnson, 543 U.S. 499 (No. 03-636). 
 171. E.g., Brief for Petitioner at 44, Johnson, 543 U.S. 499 (No. 03-636) (“[T]he present case 
is squarely governed by a specific decision of this Court which has not been overruled. Lee was 
decided under the rule of strict scrutiny applied in Brown and its progeny.”). 
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expressed in Brown and its progeny was relevant to the case. The 
highly unlikely probability, however, that the Johnson Court wholly 
forgot about one of the most famous and controversial cases in 
American legal history, not to mention a year after its fiftieth 
anniversary, necessitates more explanation as to why the Court did 
not discuss a complete prohibition on racial classifications altogether. 
2. Brown Is Doctrinally More Limited than a Complete Ban on 
Racial Segregation in All Public Facilities.  Another possibility is that 
Brown and its progeny are more limited than a complete ban, and 
have evolved into a standard similar to strict scrutiny; the Court in 
Johnson simply recognized this evolution, while harmonizing 
segregation with all racial classifications, by imposing a strict scrutiny 
standard. The Brown decision itself was limited only to the realm of 
public education.172 The expansion of Brown to other public facilities 
was accomplished in piecemeal fashion by a series of summary 
decisions in its wake.173 Although several cases cited Brown for the 
proposition that racial segregation was prohibited in all public 
facilities, the issue of racial segregation in prisons was not squarely 
addressed by the Supreme Court until the Lee decision, in which the 
three-Justice concurrence noted an exception to the prohibition in 
“particularized circumstances.”174 In his appellate brief, Johnson 
asserted that “[s]trict scrutiny is required . . . by Lee v. Washington, 
part of the post-Brown v. Board of Education line of cases that the 
Court and commentators have overwhelmingly understood as 
requiring strict scrutiny (despite the absence of those words).”175 It 
may be, therefore, that although the evolution of Brown and its 
subsequent line of affirmances expanded its reach to include racial 
segregation in all public facilities, the only Supreme Court case to 
 
 172. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“[I]n the field of public education, 
the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”). 
 173. See supra note 18 (outlining this piecemeal progression). 
 174. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (per curiam) (Black, Harlan, & Stewart, 
JJ., concurring). 
 175. Brief for Appellant at 6, Johnson, 543 U.S. 499 (No. 03-636). For support the brief cites 
as examples Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995), which cited post-Brown per curiam 
decisions for the proposition that “the State may not, absent extraordinary justification, 
segregate citizens on the basis of race”; CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS AND THE POOR 85 
(1991), in which Smith says that “[t]he Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to discriminatory 
racial classifications after Brown v. Board of Education”; and Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class 
Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 125 (1990), in which Simon asserts that 
the application of strict scrutiny “finally culminat[ed] in Brown v. Board of Education.” 
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squarely address Brown’s application in the prison context modified 
its standard to allow for racial segregation in some extraordinary 
circumstances. The Johnson Court’s imposition of strict scrutiny may 
therefore formalize “particularized circumstances”176 as a compelling 
interest, and “good faith”177 as a narrowly tailored remedy. 
3. The Evolution of Brown under Anticlassification and 
Antisubordination Principles.  A third, intellectually comprehensive 
(and perhaps the most convincing) possibility materializes when one 
examines the evolution of post-Brown jurisprudence from a more 
contextual approach. An insightful examination into this evolution 
may be found in the work of Reva Siegel.178 In light of the values 
raised by Professor Siegel’s thesis, the Johnson Court’s imposition of 
strict scrutiny on the CDC’s policy may illustrate a shift in the social 
meaning and stigmatic effects surrounding racial segregation, as well 
as the significance of that shift in terms of application over the fifty-
one years since Brown was decided. 
Although courts and scholars often invoke Brown for the 
principle that states are prohibited from classifying on the basis of 
race, the Brown opinion, in order to overrule Plessy, relied instead on 
evidence of the stigmatic and subordinative effect that segregation 
has on minority schoolchildren, thus concluding that “in the field of 
public education, the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”179 
As furious controversy and debate ensued over the Court’s reliance 
on this social science evidence, southerners resisted attempts to 
enforce Brown in other areas by insisting that such harms were not 
present in other contexts, or that integration may cause greater 
psychological or social harms than racial segregation.180 Amid heated 
political and scholarly debate over “neutral principles” and the 
meaning behind the Brown decision,181 scholars began to support a 
 
 176. Lee, 309 U.S. at 334 (per curiam) (Black, Harlan & Stewart, JJ., concurring). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification 
Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004) (exploring the 
Court’s varying degrees of application of the anticlassification principle since Brown in order to 
vindicate and sometimes mask shifting social concerns). 
 179. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 & n.11 (1954). 
 180. Siegel, supra note 178, at 1486–87. 
 181. Compare, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 33 (1959) (advocating adherence to neutral principles in constitutional 
adjudication and decrying the lack of such in the Brown decision’s reasoning), with Louis H. 
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“cooler” view that invalidated segregation on the more neutral basis 
that racial segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause solely 
because “race is an inherently arbitrary classification.”182 
This politically safer approach, the anticlassification doctrine, 
encountered difficulty when the Court faced de facto segregation in 
the northern school districts, where there were no facially segregative 
school policies but schools were segregated nonetheless. Once again, 
America wrestled with defining the principle upon which to protect 
the equal rights of all citizens.183 
The debate over whether the Equal Protection Clause prohibited 
racial classification per se (anticlassification doctrine) or status harm 
to a particular disadvantaged group (antisubordination doctrine) in 
the northern de facto segregation context then found a third arena as 
the country began to explore the contours of affirmative action.184 
Whereas the race-conscious assignments of the earlier desegregation 
movement had been seen as benign and “licit forms of racial 
classification,”185 judges now began to focus on affirmative action 
measures and questioned the constitutional limits of the presumption 
against racial classification with regard to race-conscious efforts to 
ameliorate segregation.186 Ironically, whereas harm to minority 
schoolchildren had been a driving factor in the Brown decision to end 
desegregation of schools, judgments about the potential harm to 
white applicants in professional school affirmative action cases were 
now contributing to “courts’ newfound willingness to [interpret and 
apply anticlassification principles] as a constraint on voluntary 
governmental efforts to rectify racial imbalance in educational 
 
Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1, 26–27 (1959) (positing principled bases behind the Brown decision). 
 182. Siegel, supra note 178, at 1498; see United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 
F.2d 836, 845–47 (5th Cir. 1966) (upholding federal desegregation standards in light of Brown 
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Owen H. Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The 
Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564, 591 (1965) (“[T]he Court might have relied on 
the more ‘neutral’ or ‘general’ principle that race is an inherently arbitrary classification.”). 
 183. Siegel, supra note 178, at 1500 (“[Q]uestions of anticlassification and questions of 
group status harm were not bifurcated frames of analysis, as they would later come to be. 
Anticlassification discourse acquired this new significance only as it was asked to solve a variety 
of new questions in the conflicts over implementing Brown in the North.”). 
 184. Id. (“In the debates over de facto segregation in the 1960s, one can see 
anticlassification discourse acting both to advance and to limit antisubordination aims, with the 
two forms of reasoning finally assuming familiar form as agonistic principles in the affirmative 
action debates of the early 1970s.”). 
 185. Id. at 1514. 
 186. Id. at 1527. 
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institutions.”187 In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,188 in 
which a white would-be applicant successfully challenged the 
University of California at Davis medical school admissions policy, 
Justice Powell attacked the antisubordinative idea of “stigma,” stating 
that it “reflects a subjective judgment that is standardless,” and 
argued that a deprivation to the “dominant majority” is equally 
invidious.189 Although discounting the use of stigma, the Court 
“compromised” by recognizing diversity as a compelling state interest 
that would allow states to take race-conscious measures.190 
As the previous discussion indicates, the characterization of 
Brown’s legacy continues to shift over time and in the face of new 
contexts. The strict anticlassification doctrine espoused by Powell in 
Bakke was not the ground for the Brown decision, but rather “the 
residuum of conflicts over enforcing Brown.”191 As the Court faced 
numerous racial classifications in varying social contexts over time—
de jure segregation, de facto segregation, affirmative action—it 
employed differing degrees of anticlassification and antisubordination 
principles in light of the validity of the principle to the issue and the 
social conflict surrounding it: 
It was as the nation argued over Brown’s justification and 
implementation that the Court began to rely on anticlassification 
discourse, first to express, and then to limit, antisubordination 
values. . . . [C]ourts have applied this presumption of 
unconstitutionality selectively, and in a manner that has shifted over 
time, to vindicate multiple and sometimes conflicting social 
concerns. As we have seen, at some points in our history, claims 
about the wrongs of racial classification have served to express and 
to mask constitutional concerns about practices that enforce second-
class citizenship for members of relatively powerless social groups—
and at some points in our history, claims about the wrongs of racial 
classification have served to diffuse and to limit expression of such 
concerns.192 
 
 187. Id. at 1529–30. 
 188. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) 
 189. Id. at 295 n.34 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
 190. Id. at 314–15 (“As the interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a university’s 
admissions program, the question remains whether the program’s racial classification is 
necessary to promote this interest.”). 
 191. Siegel, supra note 178, at 1533. 
 192. Id. 
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The above history and discussion highlights the evolutionary 
perspective of Brown’s main principle. Although scholars continue to 
struggle for a consistent, principled treatment of racial classifications, 
it would be difficult to argue today that a per se ban on a sole racial 
classification still exists. If post-Brown jurisprudence has revived 
antisubordination values, or put differently, has reintroduced 
antisubordination limitations onto what is no longer a pure 
anticlassification doctrine, then equal protection is about more than 
just racial classification. It must constitute some blend of 
anticlassification and antisubordination values, such that any racial 
classification is viewed not alone, but in light of its social meaning and 
effects in today’s society. Whether stigma is taken into account or not, 
when a neutral racial classification such as the CDC’s policy is 
examined in light of today’s social environment as opposed to that of 
the Brown world of 1954, the social meaning is necessarily different. 
It was virtually unmistakable that the purpose, effect, and social 
meaning of de jure racial segregation in 1954 was to maintain the 
inferiority of the minority race, and the social science cited by Brown 
indicated the imposition of a stigma on minority schoolchildren. 
Although de facto segregation and racial discrimination in American 
public schools193 continue to have a malicious grip on American 
society,194 none of the segregation that persists today is of the de jure 
kind seen in Plessy and Brown. Federal, state, and local governments 
may no longer mandate racial segregation in schools or housing. 
Interracial marriages have risen dramatically over the last few 
decades, signaling a shift in the basic structure of U.S. society.195 
 
 193. See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 782 (Vintage Books 2004) (1976) (noting 
that the number of African Americans living at or below the poverty level, having dropped 33 
percent between 1960 to 2002, was still three times higher than that for white families and that 
the average income for black men had risen from 52 percent to only 68 percent of that for the 
average white man between 1950 and 2002); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and 
Resegregation of American Public Education: The Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1598 
(2003) (“By 1991, the percentage of African-American students attending majority white 
schools in the South had decreased to 39.2% and over the course of the 1990s this number 
dropped: 36.6% in 1994; 34.7% in 1996; and 32.7% in 1998.”). 
 194. KLUGER, supra note 193, at 752–53 (noting the considerable social self-segregation in 
the lives of private individuals and the widespread feeling that “whites, in their hearts and 
minds, still viewed [blacks] by and large as their moral and intellectual inferiors . . .”). 
 195. See generally Michael J. Rosenfeld & Byung-Soo Kim, The Independence of Young 
Adults and the Rise of Interracial and Same-Sex Unions, 70 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 541 (2005) 
(suggesting that an increase in interracial and same-sex unions is partly due to the increased 
geographic mobility and urban nature of today’s young adults, signaling a change in the fabric of 
U.S. society as they distance themselves from the communities of their origins). 
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Despite persistent socio-economic inequalities and continued racial 
hostilities, the social and legal environments surrounding race 
relations in the United States have substantially evolved since 1954.196 
One might therefore say that a policy by which prison authorities 
segregate new prisoners by race for two months in an effort to protect 
them from a perceived risk of racially motivated violence, whether 
correct or incorrect, is considerably less likely to be suspected as an 
“invidious use” of race classification in 2005 than it would have been 
in 1954. It is no longer clear that a neutral policy of racial segregation, 
although perhaps less beneficial to all due to lack of diversity, will 
have a deleterious or stigmatic effect on the minority; indeed, many 
brilliant and well-qualified young minorities today choose to attend 
historically black colleges and universities.197 Perhaps it is because of 
this changed understanding of the social circumstances surrounding 
racial segregation that modern courts have felt justified in creating 
exceptions to Brown’s flat prohibition on racial segregation.198 
If racial segregation in 2005 is somehow perceived differently 
from racial segregation in 1954 in terms of antisubordination values 
such as social meaning, stigma, and effects, and if any of these values 
are ones that the Court is prepared to recognize, then the “inherent 
inequality” justification for Brown’s per se ban on racial segregation 
is no longer accurate. Just as the Brown Court felt compelled to 
“consider public education in the light of its full development and its 
present place in American life throughout the Nation,”199 perhaps the 
Johnson Court, considering the present place of penological 
administration in today’s society, implicitly or even manifestly 
 
 196. KLUGER, supra note 193, at 752 (“Fifty years after Brown, overt displays of bigotry 
were no longer socially, politically, or legally excusable. And a black presence well beyond 
tokenism had been established and was thriving almost everywhere in American society to an 
extent unimaginable half a century earlier—on every college campus, in corporate towers, on 
job sites at all skill levels, in public service up to and including the highest reaches of 
government, throughout the U.S. military, and, most visibly, in the arts, entertainment, and 
sports worlds, where stellar black performers abounded.”). 
 197. See James A. Washburn, Note, Beyond Brown: Evaluating Equality in Higher 
Education, 43 DUKE L.J. 1115, 1151–52 (1994) (citing research indicating that African-American 
students tend to thrive better personally and achieve more academically at historically black 
colleges and universities). 
 198. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992) (noting that “West Coast 
Hotel [300 U.S. 379 (1937)] and Brown each rested on facts, or an understanding of facts, 
changed from those which furnished the claimed justifications for the earlier constitutional 
resolutions”). 
 199. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954). 
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recognized a change in the understanding of circumstances that 
allows for some racially segregationist policies to be justified. Perhaps 
there are some racial classifications in 2005 that do not automatically 
carry the same subordinative meaning, and thus do not rise to the 
level of unconstitutionality. If our modern understanding of racial 
segregation thus includes both an anticlassification and an 
antisubordination analysis—that is, both the existence of a racial 
classification and an examination of its social meaning and effects—
then a question remains as to how to weigh those different concerns. 
4. The Johnson Decision Represents a Compromise between 
Three Conflicting Precedents.  Although racial segregation was 
effectively racial discrimination in the 1950s, and courts have often 
cited the principles of post-Brown jurisprudence in racial 
discrimination cases, it is not axiomatic that state-mandated 
segregation should be lumped into the strict scrutiny standard along 
with all other forms of racial discrimination. However, the Court’s 
choice, whether purposeful or reflexive, to group racial segregation 
with all other racial discrimination and to impose strict scrutiny 
presents the final possibility, that the Johnson court’s imposition of 
strict scrutiny for racial segregation in the prison context reflects a 
compromise between three conflicting lines of precedent: the outright 
ban on racial segregation as initially expressed by Brown and its 
progeny, the strict scrutiny applied to all racial classifications as seen 
in Adarand and Croson, and the deferential treatment accorded to 
prison administration by Turner. In light of the polar opposites of 
Brown and Turner, supplemented only by a muddily unhelpful three-
Justice concurrence in Lee, perhaps the Johnson Court’s treatment of 
the CDC’s policy can be seen as a properly suspect middle ground. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether the Johnson Court deliberately chose to exclude a 
discussion of Brown’s initially per se prohibition in order to illustrate 
the evolution of the doctrine, or whether the evolution of the Brown 
doctrine was so ingrained that the Court’s omission was simply 
reflexive, the newly explicit strict scrutiny standard for state-
mandated racial segregation policies has significant implications for 
civil rights litigation. These significant implications are due in large 
part to the fact that the Supreme Court grouped racial segregation in 
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with all forms of racial classification, without limiting such a 
statement to the prison context.200 
On the one hand, the implications may be minor from an 
ultimate judicial perspective—proof of a compelling interest is such a 
high bar that strict scrutiny is often said to be “strict in theory, fatal in 
fact.”201 After the Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz decisions, however, it is 
not entirely clear that a compelling governmental interest need be an 
imminent war-time emergency such as that in Korematsu; it may be as 
simple as the interest of public universities in achieving diversity.202 It 
is therefore imaginable that penological institutions have a 
compelling interest in maintaining the safety and security of prisoners 
under their custody by shielding them from the effects of racially 
motivated violence.203 
On the other hand, the difference between a per se prohibition 
and a strict scrutiny standard, although perhaps slight from a 
Supreme Court judicial perspective, becomes more significant for 
lower courts and litigators. Because the Johnson Court broadly 
asserted, without contextual limitation, that racial segregation is now 
to be treated like any other racial classification,204 any government 
policy of racial segregation would now assumedly be subject to strict 
scrutiny as opposed to a per se prohibition. In the pre-Johnson world, 
in which racial segregation was flatly prohibited, the government 
would never have adopted a policy of racial segregation, because the 
law would deem it clearly invalid. The effects of Johnson’s strict 
scrutiny standard, however, free government bodies to adopt 
measures that would have previously been struck down from the 
start, in hopes that they can subsequently compile a record 
establishing a factual basis for a claim of compelling interest. 
 
 200. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (quoting Adarand Constructors Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)). 
 201. Id. at 514 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237). 
 202. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003). 
 203. Even if the lower court were to find such an interest to be compelling on remand, the 
CDC’s policy would still have to be sufficiently narrow, and their blind racial assignment 
without any examination into history of gang affiliation or racial violence would have to be 
justified. 
 204. See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 509 (“Because the CDC’s policy is an express racial 
classification, it is ‘immediately suspect.’”). It may be worth noting that Johnson, if expanded 
beyond its factual context, evokes (although not perfectly) the single-sex education case of 
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), in which the Court held that Virginia failed to 
provide an “exceedingly persuasive justification” under heightened scrutiny for its gender 
segregation policy in education. Id. at 524. 
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Conversely, it lures plaintiffs into a difficult and almost perverse 
position, in which parties who are genuinely concerned with civil 
rights find themselves arguing against the compelling nature of a 
government’s interest in, for example, maintaining the safety of its 
prisoners or providing a first class education for all children. 
The absence of any discussion in Johnson v. California about the 
alternative of a prohibition on state-mandated racial segregation 
marks a divergence from the conventional view of post-Brown 
jurisprudence. The imposition of strict scrutiny for the Department of 
Corrections policy may be the delayed illustration of a historical 
evolution in the Court’s balance between anticlassification and 
antisubordination values, fueled by a shift in the modern societal 
meaning ascribed to neutral racial classifications. Regardless of the 
impetus behind the new standard of review for racial segregation in 
prisons, Johnson v. California muddies the legal waters for the proper 
analysis of racial segregation in other contexts, and leaves us with a 
much grayer shade of Brown. 
